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RECENT CASES
much criticism of the view that they provide only conditional
insurance.13
It is submitted that by these conditional acceptance pro-
visions insurance companies are trying to protect themselves
at the expense of their applicants. They take the premiums but
try to withhold protection. The binding clause is properly in-
terpreted as ambiguous on its face.
North Dakota recognizes that anyone who solicits insurance
in a bona fide manner serves as an agent and can bind his
principal;"4 furthermore, North Dakota recognizes that such
an agent has the implied authority to write temporary poli-
cies.1 In addition North Dakota generally construes ambigu-
ous policies against the insurer.'G
No North Dakota case has directly construed the meaning
of a conditional 'binding receipt." It seems that the better
reasoning would permit our courts to accept the position of the
dissent in the principal case and consider ambiguous binding
receipts as providing unconditional interim insurance until
complete rejection of the application is made.
R. JON FITZNER
SALES-WARRANTIES-DISCLAIMER OF IMPLIED WARRANTIES
-PROHIBITION OF AS AGAINST PUBLIC POLIcY-Plaintiff pur-
chased one of defendant-dealer's automobiles, signing the
standard contract of the Automobile Manufacturers Associa-
tion which warranted that the vehicle was free from defects
in parts, agreed to replace those parts if found defective, and
provided that the warranty was in lieu of all other warranties,
express or implied. The buyer brought this action to rescind
the purchase because of a breach of the implied warranty of
13. See generally Havighurst, LIFE INSURANCE BINDING RECEIPTS,
33 Ill. L. Rev. 180 (1938); Western and Southern Life Ins. Co. v. Vale, 213
Ind. 601, 12 N.E.2d 350 (1938); Francis v. Mut. Life Ins. Co. of New York,
55 Ore. 280, 106 Pac. 323 (1910); Starr v. Mut. Life Ins. Co. of New York,
41 Wash. 228, 83 Pac. 116 (1905).
14. Fargo Nat'l Bank v. Agricultural Ins. Co., 184 F.2d 676 (8th Cir.
1950).
15. Michigan Idaho Lumber Company v. Northern Fire and Marine Ins.
Co., 35 N.D. 244, 160 N.W. 130 (1916); Ulledalen v. United States Fire Ils.
Co., 74 N.D. 589, 23 N.W.2d 856 (1946) Agent allowed to insure during the
lapse of time between the time of application and the issuing of the policy.
16. Minnesota Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Marshall, 29 F.2d 977 (8th Cir. 1928);
Beauchamp v. Retail Merchants Ass'n. Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 38 N.D. 483, 165
N.W. 545 (1917); Persellin v. State Automobile Ins. Ass'n., 75 N.D. 716, 32
N.W.2d 644 (1948)"... where the terms of an insurance policy will bear
two interpretations, that one will be adopted which sustains the claim for
indemnity."
1962]
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fitness. The Supreme Court of North Dakota held, one judge
dissenting, that the express warranty disclaimed implied war-
ranties and that the disclaimer was not contrary to public
policy. Knecht v. Universal Motor Company, 113 N.W.2d 688
(N. D. 1962).
The early common law did not recognize implied warranties
of quality in the sale of chattels.' The maxim caveat emptor
was generally applied to relieve the seller from liability when
the goods he sold were defective or of a poor quality.2 The doc-
trine of implied warranty, which arose in order to alleviate the
harsh results of the rule of caveat emptor,3 probably had its,
origin in the case of Gardiner v. Gray.' From a rather limited
application in that case the doctrine has developed into one of
the most controversial areas of the law of sales.5
In North Dakota, as in other jurisdictions where the Uni-
form Sales Act is in effect, certain specified implied warran-
ties are imposed by operation of law and become a part of the
contract by virtue of the statute.6 A warranty of merchanta-
bility is a warranty that the goods are reasonable fit for the
general purpose for which they are sold, while a warranty of
fitness is a warranty that the goods are suitable for the special
purpose of the buyer.7
Parties who buy and sell goods may usually, by appropriate
terms in their contracts, disclaim whatever warranties they
please, including implied warranties." This rule was codified
into section 71 of the Uniform Sales Act.9 Nevertheless, since
implied warranties arise to protect the buyer, courts have gen-
erally held that disclaimers must be strictly construed against
the seller and must be express in their terms.10 In an effort to
1. 1 WILLISTON, SALES § 228 (rev. ed. 1948).
2. Ibid.
3. Swift & Co. v. Etheridge, 190 N.C. 162, 129 S.E. 453 (1925).
4. 4 Camp. 144, 171 Eng. Rep. 46 (1815).
5. VOLD, SALES 444 (2d ed. 1959).
6. N.D. Cent. Code § 51-01; Deere & Webber Co. v. Moch, 71 N.D.
649, 3 N.W.2d 471 (1942).
7. Dunbar Bros. Co. v. Consolidated Iron-Steel Mfg. Co., 23 F.2d 416,
419 (2d Cir. 1928); Knapp v. Willys-Ardmore, Inc., 174 Pa. Super. 9"0, 100
A.2d 105 (1953).
8. VOLD, SALES 444 (2d ed 1959); 1 WILIASTON, SALES § 239C (rev.
ed. 1948); See Minneapolis Threshing Mach. Co. v. Hocking, 54 N.D. 559,
209 N.W. 996 (1926).
9. N.D. Cent. Code § 51-02-72. "Where any right, duty, or liabili-
ty would arise under a contract to sell or a sale by implication of law, it
may be negatived or varied by express agreement or by the course of deal-
ing between the parties .... "
10. See, e. g., Roberts Distrib. Co. v. Kaye-Halbert Corp., 126 Cal. App.
2d 664, 272 P.2d 886 (Dist. Ct. App. 1954); Wade v. Chariot Trailer Co., 331
Mich. 576, 50 N.W.2d 162 (1951); Deere & Weber Co. v. Moch, 71 N.D. 649.
3 N.W.2d 471 (1942).
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achieve equitable results, disclaimers have been held to be in-
effective where the circumstances are such that the buyer
could not be expected to be aware of the disclaimer" or had no
actual knowledge of its presence. 12 Courts of other jurisdic-
tions have given the disclaimer its full effect's and have held
that it does not violate public policy.
14
There are a number of recent cases declaring invalid dis-
claimers of warranties in automobile contracts'5 of which
Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc. 16 is probably the lead-
ing case because of the extensive and well written opinion set
forth. The only variance in material facts from the instant
case, for purposes of this discussion, is that there was physical
and property damage as a result of the defective part. In that
case the court held that the disclaimer was a contract imposed
by a noncompetitive industry giving the buyer only the e. oice
of buying a car under that contract or buying no car.1 7 For
this reason the court declared the disclaimer void as outside
section 71 of the Sales Act, implying that such an agreement
must be equitable and bargained for, rather than imposed, to
be within the act.- The Henningsen case has received favor-
able comment from many legal writers.19 It has been stated
that:
"Such unbridled freedom of contract as is represented
by the uniform disclaimed clause of the Automobile Manu-
facturers Association leads to a dictation of law by con-
11. Gray v. Gurney Seed and Nursery Co., 62 S.D. 97, 252 N.W. 3 (1933).
12. Stevenson v. B. B. Kirkland Seed Co., 176 S.C. 345, 180 S.E. 197 (1935);
ef. Reliance Varnish Co. v. Mullins Lumber Co., 213 S.C. 84, 48 S.E.2d 653
(1948) (no finding of actual notice).
13. Shafer v. Reo Motors, 205 F.2d 685 (3d Cir. 1952); L. 1R. Cooke
Chevrolet Co. v. Culligan Soft Water Serv., 282 S.W.2d 349 (Ky. 1955); Hall
v. Everett Motors, Inc.. 165 N.E.2d 107 (Mass. 1960).
14. Brokerick Haulage, Inc. v. Mack-International Motor Truck Corp..
1 App. Div. 2d 649, 153 N.Y.S.2d 127 (Sup. Ct. 1926).
15. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Anderson-Weber, Inc., 110 N.W.2d
449 (Iowa 1961); Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 161
A.2d 69 (1960); General Motors Corp. v. Dodson, 338 S.W.2d 655 (Tenn.
App. 1960).
16. 161 A.2d 69 (N.J. 1960).
17. Id. at 87.
18. Id. at 95. The court also could see no reason for distinguishing be-
tween the automobile industry, where all manufacturers through standard
trade organization sales contracts offer the same limited warranty, from
traditional areas of public or quasi-public service where disclaimers of
liability are denied effect, as being against public policy. The case stated
that the disclaimer was "so inimical to the public good as to compel an ad-
judication of its invalidity."
19. See, e.g., 1 CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 128 (Supp. 1961). "This
treatise supports the decision (the Henningsen case) and expects it to be
accepted and followed by other courts. The (disclaimer) provision should
be withdrawn, and any substitute should be such as to give a buyer rea-
sonable assurance that the machine is fit for the purposes for which it is
sold and that the manufacturer will be responsible in damages in case of
breach."
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tract with an effect equal to that of a uniformly adopted
statute exempting an industry from all implied warran-
ties. The result of course is to forsake the very freedom
of contract that is sought to be achieved.
' ' 20
The question arises as to whether disclaimers should be held
void only when the article in question is inherently dangerous
and the plaintiff has suffered personal injuries or property
damage.2 1 The nature of the product and the presence of per-
sonal injuries or property damage should be factors to con-
sider, even though they are not necessary in order to hold a
disclaimer void as against public policy.
In the instant case the buyer suffered no monetary loss,
property damage or physical injury. Certain parts were de-
fective and were replaced by the dealer according to the ex-
press terms of the warranty. It appears that in no other case
holding the disclaimer void was it possible for the part to be
repaired and replaced. The facts in the instant case should not
be held sufficient to nullify section 71 of the Sales Act on the
basis of public policy. It should also be noted that the North
Dakota court did have precedent in that a prior case held that
a disclaimer was valid, effective and not against public pol-
icy. 22
The ideal resolution of the consumer-manufacturer-deal-
er conflict of damage resulting from defective construction
may lie in legislative prohibition of disclaimers in certain
areas. Possibly legislation should prohibit uniform disclaim-
ers in the manufacturer's suggested contract, but retain the
generally unexercised right of the buyer and the dealer to
bargain freely for the warranties and disclaimers they desire
in their contract. Public policy will then be determined as it
properly should be, by the legislature rather than the 
courts..2 1
A. WILLIAM LUCAS
20. Note, 8 U.C.L.A.L. Rev. 658, 663 (1961).
21. Note, 46 Cornell L.Q. 607, 610 (1961). An excellent discussion of the
Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc. case in which was stated that "A
person whose car is seriously damaged due to a defective part would seem
to be no less deserving of compensation because he was fortunate enough
to escape without bodily injury."
22. Minneapolis Threshing Mach. Co. v. Hocking, 54 N.D. 559, 209 N.W.
996 (1926) (This case involved threshing machinery).
23. It should be noted that North Dakota has already enacted legislation
with respect to disclaimers in two very limited areas, farm Implements
and seeds. N.D. Cent. Code §§ 51-07-07 and 4-09-14.
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